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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
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James Freeman recently lost an arbitration dispute. 
Soon thereafter, he discovered that the arbitrator had 
received contributions for a judicial campaign from PPG 
Industries, the defendants’ minority owner. Freeman filed 
a motion to vacate the arbitration award, but he 
conveniently failed to mention that the law firm 
representing him had contributed a far greater amount to 
the same campaign. The District Court denied the 
motion, and we will affirm. 
I 
Freeman was a director of operations at PPG Auto 
Glass until his firing in 2008. At the time of Freeman’s 
firing, PPG Auto Glass was a division of PPG Industries. 
Since then, PGW Auto Glass and Pittsburgh Glass 
Works—collectively known as PGW—have assumed 
PPG Auto Glass’s liabilities. Significantly, PPG 
Industries maintains a 40-percent interest in PGW. 
After losing his job, Freeman sued PGW in the 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. 
Freeman was sixty years old at the time of his firing, and 
he brought a claim under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The case was 
assigned to U.S. District Judge Arthur Schwab. At the 
close of discovery, Judge Schwab held a settlement 
conference at which the parties entered a binding 
arbitration agreement. The court directed the clerk to 
mark the case closed. See Supp. App. 11 (“[T]his case 
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shall be marked CLOSED.”).1
As part of the agreement, both sides listed three 
potential arbitrators, and Maureen Lally-Green appeared 
at the top of both lists. Lally-Green is an experienced 
jurist who served as a judge on the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court for over a decade. Two years before her retirement 
in 2009, she made an unsuccessful bid for a seat on the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. She now works in private 
practice and teaches at Duquesne University School of 
Law. 
 
On August 22, 2011, the parties spoke with Lally-
Green for the first time. She reminded them, “you all 
know that it’s a small legal community here,” and she 
acknowledged that she “knew some people at PPG 
[Industries],” the minority owner of PGW. App. 5e to 5f. 
She also told the parties that she taught a seminar on 
labor law. According to PGW, she explained that she 
taught the seminar with Joseph Mack, PPG Industries’ 
senior employment attorney. See Supp. App. 65; App. 8c. 
But Freeman maintains that she did not mention Mack or 
reveal anything else about her relationship with PPG 
Industries. See App. 7a to 7b. Undeterred, the parties 
proceeded with Lally-Green as their arbitrator. 
                                           
1 The parties filed separate appendices. We refer to 
Freeman’s appendix as “App.” and to PGW’s appendix 
as “Supp. App.” 
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Lally-Green conducted a hearing near the end of 
2011. Each side had a day to present evidence. By all 
accounts, the proceeding was fair and thorough—neither 
party raises any issue concerning the arbitration hearing 
itself. One month later, Lally-Green issued a lengthy 
opinion that rejected Freeman’s discrimination claim. 
She concluded that Freeman lost his job because he “had 
limited recent sales experience . . . [and] received 
average performance ratings in a poorly performing 
region.” Supp. App. 54. 
Three months later, Freeman filed a motion in the 
District Court to vacate Lally-Green’s arbitration 
decision. Whether born of sour grapes or a desire for 
justice, this motion claimed that Lally-Green had failed 
to disclose campaign contributions that she had received 
from PPG Industries and its employees during her 
Supreme Court bid. These contributions totaled $4,500.2
                                           
2 Lally-Green received $2,000 from PPG 
Industries, $1,000 from Mack, the company’s senior 
employment attorney, $500 from its general counsel and 
senior vice president, $500 from its vice president of 
government affairs, and $500 from its director of 
government affairs. See App. 3b. 
 
To put this in perspective, Lally-Green raised over $1.7 
million during her unsuccessful campaign. See Supp. 
App. 85. The motion also claimed that Lally-Green had 
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failed to disclose her teaching relationship with Mack. In 
light of these nondisclosures, Freeman urged the District 
Court to vacate the arbitration. He argued that Lally-
Green was evidently partial in violation of 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10(a)(2) and that she had fraudulently induced the 
arbitration agreement.3
Freeman’s motion omitted an important fact. As 
PGW soon pointed out, Lally-Green had received more 
than five times as much money—roughly $26,000—from 
the law firm that represented Freeman during the 
arbitration.
 
4
                                           
3 According to the relevant statutory language, 
“[i]n any of the following cases the United States court in 
and for the district wherein the award was made may 
make an order vacating the award upon the application of 
any party to the arbitration—(1) where the award was 
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means [or]; (2) 
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). 
 This firm continues to represent Freeman on 
appeal. To prove Lally-Green’s impartiality, PGW cited 
the two-sided nature of the contributions as well her 
4 Lally-Green received $20,000 from the law firm 
of Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel and $6,153 
from three attorneys at the firm. See App. 3b. Freeman’s 
counsel of record on appeal apparently did not contribute 
to the campaign. 
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equanimity during the proceedings. PGW also argued 
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
motion because it had closed the original case.  
The District Court saw “no reason why the [ ] 
challenge [could] not occur in the same case as the 
original proceeding.” App. 3g n.1. As for Freeman’s 
partiality and fraud claims, the court concluded that 
Lally-Green’s nondisclosures were immaterial and 
insubstantial. The court thus denied Freeman’s motion, 
and Freeman filed a timely notice of appeal. 
Freeman now maintains that Lally-Green was 
evidently partial and that she fraudulently induced the 
arbitration agreement. For its part, PGW denies these 
allegations and raises two threshold arguments—namely, 
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
Freeman’s motion and that Freeman waived his partiality 
objection. We turn to these arguments. 
II 
We must first decide whether the District Court 
had jurisdiction to consider Freeman’s motion to vacate. 
The court indisputably had federal-question jurisdiction 
to consider his initial complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. But in 
PGW’s view, the court lost jurisdiction once it closed the 
case and sent the parties to arbitration. If so, the court 
would need a separate jurisdictional basis to consider 
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Freeman’s motion to vacate.5
 Federal courts have long distinguished dismissals 
from administrative closings. The two procedures have 
different practical and jurisdictional effects. The Supreme 
Court discussed the effects of a dismissal in Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). There, 
the district court had dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with 
prejudice after referring the parties to arbitration. The 
Supreme Court considered whether that dismissal was an 
 Absent a separate basis, the 
court lacked jurisdiction and we must remand for 
dismissal. See Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 
1039, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993). The problem with this 
argument is that it relies on a faulty premise. As will 
soon be clear, the District Court never lost jurisdiction 
because it administratively closed the case. 
                                           
5 The District Court lacked any independent 
federal-question jurisdiction to consider Freeman’s 
motion. His motion challenged the arbitration based on 
the Federal Arbitration Act, which “does not create any 
independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 or otherwise.”  Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983). 
The parties disagree whether the District Court had 
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, but we 
need not decide that issue because, as we explain, the 
District Court retained federal-question jurisdiction. 
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appealable final order under the Federal Arbitration Act. 
It noted that the “order plainly disposed of the entire case 
on the merits and left no part of it pending before the 
court.” Id. at 86. It then stated that the Federal Arbitration 
Act “permit[s] parties to arbitration agreements to bring a 
separate proceeding in a district court to enter judgment 
on an arbitration award once it is made (or to vacate or 
modify it).” Id.  
Our cases have extended the Supreme Court’s 
analysis. Two years after Green Tree, we held that any 
order that dismisses a case for arbitration is final—even 
when the district court dismisses the case without 
prejudice. See Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 
595, 602 (3d Cir. 2002). We noted that “[t]he Green Tree 
decision draws a distinction between dismissals and 
stays, but does not draw any distinctions within the 
universe of dismissals.” Id.; see Morton Int’l v. A.E. 
Staley Mfg., 460 F.3d 470, 477–78 (3d Cir. 2006). As a 
result, anyone who wishes to challenge an arbitration 
after a dismissal must bring a separate action. See Green 
Tree, 531 U.S. at 86. 
By contrast, administrative closings are not final 
orders. See WRS, Inc. v. Plaza Entm’t, 402 F.3d 424, 429 
(3d Cir. 2005). We first discussed administrative closings 
in Penn West Associates v. Cohen, 371 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 
2004). In that case, the parties had reached a tentative 
settlement agreement. The district court then ordered the 
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clerk to mark the case “closed.” Id. at 121. We concluded 
that the district court had administratively closed the 
case. For that reason, the court should have reopened the 
case after the agreement fell apart.  
District courts often use administrative closings to 
prune their overgrown dockets. Id. at 128. The practical 
effect is “to remove a case from the court’s active docket 
and permit the transfer of records associated with the 
case to an appropriate storage repository.” Lehman v. 
Revolution Portfolio L.L.C., 166 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 
1999). Administrative closings are particularly useful “in 
circumstances in which a case, though not dead, is likely 
to remain moribund for an appreciable period of time.” 
Id.  
Most importantly, administrative closings have no 
effect on the district court’s jurisdiction. Penn West, 371 
F.3d at 128. As the First Circuit explained, 
“[a]dministrative closings comprise a familiar, albeit 
essentially ad hoc, way in which courts remove cases 
from their active files without making any final 
adjudication.” Lehman, 166 F.3d at 392. This means that 
a court may reopen a closed case—either on its own or at 
the request of either party—even if it lacks an 
independent jurisdictional basis for doing so. See Fla. 
Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Bush, 246 F.3d 1296, 
1298 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Designating a case ‘closed’ does 
not prevent the court from reactivating a case either of its 
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own accord or at the request of the parties.”). There is 
substantial unanimity on this issue. See Dees v. Billy, 394 
F.3d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]hose circuits that 
have confronted the issue have unanimously [agreed] . . . 
that an administrative closing has no jurisdictional 
effect.”); Penn-Am. Ins. v. Mapp, 521 F.3d 290, 297 (4th 
Cir. 2008); cf. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 87 n.2 
(concluding that if the district court had “entered a stay 
instead of a dismissal,” its order would not have been 
final). 
It is clear that the District Court administratively 
closed Freeman’s case. On August 5, 2011, the parties 
agreed to arbitrate their dispute. The court ordered that 
the case “be marked CLOSED.” Supp. App. 11. After 
losing at arbitration, Freeman filed a motion to vacate the 
decision. The District Court denied that motion on April 
9, 2012 and stated that the case “shall REMAIN 
CLOSED.” Supp. App. 10. The court never mentioned a 
dismissal—either with or without prejudice. Indeed, the 
order used language that closely matches the language in 
our prior closing cases. Compare Penn West, 371 F.3d at 
121 (“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the 
Court mark the above captioned matter closed.”), and 
WRS, 402 F.3d at 426 (“The Clerk shall accordingly 
mark the above-captioned case as closed.”), with Supp. 
App. 11 (“[T]his case shall be marked CLOSED.”). 
PGW nevertheless urges us to construe the District 
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Court’s order as a final order—in effect, a dismissal—
because it “end[ed] the litigation on the merits and le[ft] 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” 
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). In 
short, PGW wants us to ignore the text of the order and 
divine a contrary judicial intent. That we will not do.  
Words matter. “The judicial process works best 
when orders mean what they say. Surprising 
interpretations of simple language—perhaps on the basis 
of a judicial intent not revealed in the words—
unnecessarily create complex questions and can cause 
persons to forfeit their rights unintentionally.” Adams v. 
Lever Bros. Co., 874 F.2d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 1989). 
Consistent with this principle, we have rejected previous 
attempts to characterize an administrative closing as a 
final order in disguise, see Penn West, 371 F.3d at 129, as 
have other circuits, see, e.g., Penn-Am. Ins., 521 F.3d at 
297.6
                                           
6 The First Circuit has confronted the opposite 
issue: whether to recharacterize a so-called dismissal 
order as an administrative closing when the order was not 
final. See Lehman, 166 F.3d at 391–92 (concluding that 
the district court’s order was an administrative closing, 
despite the label “procedural order of dismissal,” because 
it was not a final judgment that could be corrected under 
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Nor can we say that the closing somehow matured 
into a final order. To be sure, “a district court can 
provide, in the text of its order, a built-in timetable under 
which the administrative closing may automatically 
expire, or, alternatively, mature into a final decision.” 
Penn West, 371 F.3d at 128 (noting that an administrative 
closing did not become a final order despite the passing 
of three years). But the court’s order in this case 
contained no such timetable. And even if it had, such 
orders “are not entirely self executing. [They] must still 
be entered into the docket before they can be considered 
final orders of dismissal.” WRS, 402 F.3d at 428 (citing 
United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 220 (1973) 
(per curiam)). 
Moreover, PGW misinterprets the District Court’s 
order. Contrary to PGW’s suggestion, the order left more 
“for the court to do [than] execute the judgment.” Catlin, 
324 U.S. at 233. Indeed, by closing the case—rather than 
dismissing it—the court maintained an implicit 
supervisory role over the arbitration. This allowed the 
parties to return to the same courtroom if problems arose 
during the arbitration—for example, if the proposed 
arbitrators were unavailable, one of the parties failed to 
show up for arbitration, or even, as Freeman alleges, the 
                                                                                              
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60). That issue is not 
before us. 
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arbitrator violated 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). To put it another 
way, the court’s order required it to act as a judicial 
backstop in the event that the arbitration fell apart. This 
practice is not only permissible but also laudable. When 
problems arise during arbitration, it often makes sense for 
the parties to return to a judge who is already familiar 
with the case. See Lehman, 166 F.3d at 392 (“We endorse 
the judicious use of administrative closings by district 
courts.”).7
We conclude that the District Court’s order—
which closed the case and sent the parties to arbitration—
did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Because the 
District Court retained jurisdiction, it correctly entered a 
final order when it denied Freeman’s motion to vacate. In 
turn, we have jurisdiction to consider Freeman’s appeal 
 
                                           
7 Although the order left more “for the court to do 
[than] execute the judgment,” Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233, 
that conclusion is not necessary to our holding. For the 
reasons already stated, the District Court would have 
retained jurisdiction even if the order otherwise 
resembled a final order. This is consistent with Kokkonen 
v. Guardian Life Insurance, 511 U.S. 375 (1994), which 
concluded that district courts are free to enforce 
settlement agreements if they “reserve[d] jurisdiction” to 
do so. Id. at 377, 379. We view administrative closings as 
a method of reserving jurisdiction. 
 
15 
 
under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) (“An appeal may be taken from 
. . . a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is 
subject to this title.”). 
III 
We must also decide whether Freeman waived his 
“evident partiality” claim under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). Both 
sides agree that he failed to raise any concerns during the 
arbitration proceeding. This suggests that he waived his 
claim. In his defense, Freeman contends that Lally-Green 
deceived him and left him unaware of her true 
relationship with PPG Industries. He argues that he could 
not bring forth information that had been withheld from 
him. Whatever the merits of this contention, we will not 
apply the doctrine of waiver to Freeman’s claim 
because—ironically enough—PGW failed to invoke it in 
the District Court. 
We generally refuse to consider issues that the 
parties have not raised below. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 
U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, 
that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue 
not passed upon below.”). In a recent case, we noted that 
the appellant “did not raise [its] claim in the Bankruptcy 
Court,” and we refused to “consider new claims for the 
first time on appeal.” In re Reliant Energy Channelview 
LP, 594 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2010). As the Supreme 
Court has pointed out, the doctrine of appellate waiver 
“is essential in order that parties may have the 
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opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant 
to the issues.” Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 
(1941).8
Despite this general rule, it is within our discretion 
to consider an issue that the parties did not raise below. 
See, e.g., Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“This Court has discretionary power to address 
issues that have been waived.”). The Supreme Court has 
explained that doing so is “left primarily to the discretion 
of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of 
individual cases.” Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121; see also 
Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 92 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 
1996). For example, we might consider a waived issue 
when “the proper resolution is beyond any doubt” or 
when “injustice might otherwise result.” Singleton, 428 
U.S. at 121 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see 
also Kramer v. Gates, 481 F.3d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
 
Our Court has yet to explain how waiver applies in 
                                           
8 The doctrine of appellate waiver should not, of 
course, be confused with an identically named provision 
in many plea agreements. See United States v. Goodson, 
544 F.3d 529, 531 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that an 
“appellate waiver” is a provision in plea agreements that 
“waive[s] [the] right to file a direct appeal”). 
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the arbitration context. PGW asserts that a party waives 
any partiality claim under the Federal Arbitration Act if 
the party failed to raise its concerns during arbitration. 
Other circuits would generally agree. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. 
Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1313 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (applying waiver to claims under 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10(a)(2)); JCI Comm’ns v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 
Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2003) (same). 
That said, most circuits have recognized that a 
blanket waiver rule is inappropriate. The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that waiver applies only if the party knew of 
the facts suggesting bias during the proceeding. See 
Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 
(6th Cir. 1989) (applying waiver only if “[a]ll the facts 
now argued as to [the] alleged bias were known . . . at the 
time the [arbitrator] heard their grievances” (quoting 
Early v. E. Transfer, 699 F.2d 552, 558 (1st Cir. 1983))); 
cf. United Steelworkers of Am. Local 1913 v. Union R.R. 
Co., 648 F.2d 905, 913 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying a similar 
rule to a private labor board acting under 45 U.S.C. 
§ 153). The Ninth Circuit extended this rule to situations 
where the party “has constructive knowledge of a 
potential conflict but fails to timely object.” Fid. Fed. 
Bank, 386 F.3d at 1313 (citing JCI Comm’ns, 324 F.3d at 
52). The court viewed this as a better approach “in light 
of [its] policy favoring the finality of arbitration awards.” 
Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit’s approach has considerable 
merit: a party waives later challenges only if it “either 
knew or should have known of the facts indicating 
partiality.” Id. This approach allows a party to challenge 
an arbitration when it had no way of discovering the 
arbitrator’s bias beforehand. At the same time, it 
encourages investigation by making the parties 
accountable for information they should have known. 
Moreover, it prevents the losing party from receiving a 
second bite at the apple. See Early, 699 F.2d at 558 
(“[W]e cannot accept that parties have a right to keep two 
strings to their bow—to seek victory before the tribunal 
and then, having lost, seek to overturn it for bias never 
before claimed.”).  
But we need not adopt any approach today. The 
doctrine of appellate waiver is not somehow exempt from 
itself. See, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344, 351 
(6th Cir. 2010). This means that a party can waive a 
waiver argument by not making the argument below or in 
its briefs. A case from the Seventh Circuit is instructive. 
United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991). 
There, the district court had improperly admitted two 
guns into evidence. Id. at 380–81. The defendant did not 
object to the admission of guns at the time, but he later 
objected on appeal. The Seventh Circuit noted that the 
defendant likely waived his objection. Yet the court 
concluded that the government waived any waiver 
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argument by failing to raise the issue “in its brief . . . [or] 
at oral argument.” Id. at 375 (“[T]he government has now 
waived waiver as a defense.”). The court thus considered 
the defendant’s objection.  
That is similar to the situation here. PGW never 
presented its waiver argument to the District Court.9
IV 
 For 
that reason, the District Court never decided whether 
Freeman had waived his challenge to Lally-Green’s 
impartiality. Nor did the court invite the parties to 
develop the record on the issue. PGW’s silence is 
particularly vexing because, as outlined above, whether 
Freeman waived his objection likely depends on whether 
he knew or should have known of the campaign 
contributions during the arbitration. See Bagot, 398 F.3d 
at 256 (explaining that the applicability of waiver 
depends on whether “additional fact-finding is 
necessary”). We are in no position to analyze PGW’s 
fact-dependent waiver argument on appeal.  
We now turn to the merits of Freeman’s claims. 
Our review of the District Court’s decision not to vacate 
the arbitration “proceed[s] like [our] review of any other 
                                           
9 PGW never mentioned the doctrine of waiver in 
its response to Freeman’s motion to vacate, see App. 81 
to 8r, or in its motion to strike Freeman’s motion to 
vacate, see Supp. App. 91–102. 
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district court decision”—we review its legal conclusions 
de novo and its factual findings for clear error. First 
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947–48 
(1995); Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d 513, 521 (3d Cir. 2009). 
It is rare for us to disturb an arbitration award. We 
will “vacate [an award] only under [the] exceedingly 
narrow circumstances” listed in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). Dluhos 
v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003); see also 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 
1768 n.3 (2010) (suggesting that vacatur also is 
appropriate to correct a “manifest disregard” of the law 
either because that standard provides “an independent 
ground for review” or because it is “a judicial gloss on 
the enumerated grounds . . . set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10”). 
As we have explained, “[w]e do not entertain claims that 
an arbitrator has made factual or legal errors. Rather, 
mindful of the strong federal policy in favor of 
commercial arbitration, we begin with the presumption 
that the award is enforceable.” Sutter v. Oxford Health 
Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2012). 
V 
Freeman claims that Lally-Green was evidently 
partial in violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). This provision 
of the Federal Arbitration Act allows courts to vacate an 
arbitration award “upon the application of any party to 
the arbitration . . . where there was evident partiality or 
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corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.” 
According to Freeman, Lally-Green violated this 
standard because she failed to disclose two facts: the 
campaign funds from PPG Industries and her teaching 
relationship with Mack. We disagree. 
A 
The first order of business is to define “evident 
partiality” under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10(a)(2). Freeman argues that the Act condemns even 
the appearance of bias. This would mean that the 
standard for arbitrators is the same as the disqualification 
standard for federal judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 
Under that standard, “what matters is not the reality of 
bias or prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994) (interpreting § 455(a)). 
In response, PGW contends that the “evident partiality” 
standard is less restrictive.  
The confusion over this issue stems from 
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty 
Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). In that alliterative case, Justice 
Hugo Black wrote a plurality opinion stating that “[w]e 
can perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the 
arbitration process will be hampered by the simple 
requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any 
dealings that might create an impression of possible 
bias.” Id. at 149 (plurality). He also remarked that “any 
tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies 
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not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the 
appearance of bias.” Id. (plurality) (emphasis added). 
That language is clear, but only three other justices 
joined the opinion. Two justices concurred in an opinion 
by Justice Byron White, and three justices dissented. 
When interpreting fractured opinions, we look to 
the narrowest grounds for judgment. See Marks v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented 
Court decides a case . . . the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” 
(citation and quotation marks omitted)). Justice White’s 
concurrence refused to define “evident partiality” 
generally. “The Court does not decide today that 
arbitrators are to be held to the standards of judicial 
decorum of Article III judges.” Commonwealth Coatings, 
393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring). He instead 
enunciated a much narrower rule: arbitrators must tell the 
parties about any “substantial interest [they have] in a 
firm” that does business with one of the parties. Id. at 
151–52 (White, J., concurring). Justice White’s 
concurrence is the narrowest grounds for judgment, 
which means that it is the holding of the Court.10
                                           
10 Although Justice White proclaimed to be “glad 
to join [ ] Brother Black’s opinion,” Commonwealth 
Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring), most 
 It also 
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means that the plurality’s discussion of appearances is 
nonbinding. 
And that is how other courts have interpreted 
Commonwealth Coatings. Nearly two decades after the 
decision, the Second Circuit interpreted the phrase 
“evident partiality” and declared that it was facing “a 
relatively clean slate.” Morelite Constr. v. New York City 
Dist. Council Carpenters Ben. Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83 
(2d Cir. 1984). It rejected the appearance standard and 
held “that ‘evident partiality’ within the meaning of 9 
U.S.C. § 10 will be found where a reasonable person 
would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to 
one party to the arbitration.” Id. at 84.  
Other courts soon followed the Second Circuit’s 
                                                                                              
courts have concluded that Justice White did not in fact 
join the plurality opinion—primarily because his analysis 
is at odds with the plurality’s analysis. See, e.g., Morelite 
Constr. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Ben. 
Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 82–83 (2d Cir. 1984). The Fifth 
Circuit discussed this issue at length in an en banc 
opinion and reached the same conclusion. Positive 
Software Solutions v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 
F.3d 278, 280–85 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc). We 
implicitly agreed with these courts when we adopted the 
Morelite standard in Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, 
Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1523 n.30 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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lead. See, e.g., Apperson, 879 F.2d at 1358 (“We agree 
with the Morelite court’s analysis.”); JCI Comm’ns, Inc., 
324 F.3d at 51; ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., 173 
F.3d 493, 500-01 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Positive 
Software Solutions v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 
F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (interpreting 
“evident partiality” “practically rather than with utmost 
rigor”). Under this standard, “[t]he alleged partiality must 
be direct, definite, and capable of demonstration.” 
Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 308, 329 
(6th Cir. 1998). The party asserting bias “must establish 
specific facts that indicate improper motives on the part 
of an arbitrator.” Peoples Sec. Life Ins. v. Monumental 
Life Ins., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993). 
We embraced this standard in a footnote. See 
Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1523 
n.30 (3d Cir. 1994). “[T]o show evident partiality,” we 
explained, “the challenging party must show a reasonable 
person would have to conclude that the arbitrator was 
partial to the other party to the arbitration.” Id. (quoting 
Apperson, 879 F.2d at 1358) (quotation marks omitted)). 
Although our discussion was abbreviated, we noted that 
“[e]vident partiality is strong language and requires proof 
of circumstances powerfully suggestive of bias.” Id. 
(quotation marks and citations omitted). We have yet to 
revisit this standard in a precedential opinion, nor have 
we explained whether it applies in all cases under the 
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Federal Arbitration Act. 
In response to the parties’ confusion, we take this 
opportunity to reaffirm what we said in Kaplan. An 
arbitrator is evidently partial only if a reasonable person 
would have to conclude that she was partial to one side. 
Id. The conclusion of bias must be ineluctable, the 
favorable treatment unilateral. See Andersons, 166 F.3d 
at 329 (“The alleged partiality must be direct, definite, 
and capable of demonstration.”).  
This standard requires a stronger showing—
namely, partiality that is evident—than does the 
appearance standard, and for good reason. Most 
importantly, the relevant statutory language indicates that 
the two standards should be different. See Zimmerman v. 
Norfolk S. Corp., — F.3d — , 2013 WL 238789, *4 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (“Statutory interpretation requires that we 
begin with a careful reading of the text.”). The Federal 
Arbitration Act requires a party to show “evident 
partiality.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). The word “evident” 
suggests that the statute requires more than a vague 
appearance of bias. Rather, the arbitrator’s bias must be 
sufficiently obvious that a reasonable person would 
easily recognize it. By contrast, the judicial standard 
requires recusal if a judge’s “impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). This 
language suggests that the judicial inquiry focuses on 
appearances—“not on whether the judge actually 
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harbored subjective bias.” In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97, 101 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
In addition, parties often select arbitrators 
precisely because they are industry insiders. Parties want 
someone who understands their business—even if that 
person already has some familiarity with the parties and 
issues. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 
(White, J., concurring) (“It is often because they are 
[people] of affairs, not apart from but of the marketplace, 
that they are effective in their adjudicatory function.”); 
see also Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the 
Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, 
Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724, 1728 
(2001) (“Arbitrators are selected for their experience in 
their respective industry and their reputation for integrity 
and fairness.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
An overly strict appearance standard would exclude some 
of the most qualified arbitrators. 
And unlike litigants in court, parties in arbitration 
are generally free to choose their own adjudicator. This 
choice occurs either when the parties initially enter a 
contract or when a dispute later arises. If the parties are 
willing to proceed in the face of apparent bias, they 
should be free to do so. See Commonwealth Coatings, 
393 U.S. at 151 (White, J., concurring) (noting that 
“parties [ ] are the architects of their own arbitration 
process”). To be sure, the Federal Arbitration Act does 
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not allow parties to proceed in the face of actual bias. 
The assumption is that anyone who selected a partial 
arbitrator likely held the mistaken belief that the 
arbitrator was in fact impartial. Cf. Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 153 (1981) (stating that parties may void 
contracts in certain instances of unilateral mistake). 
Finally, the standard for judges is meant “to 
protect the public’s confidence in the judiciary.” Antar, 
71 F.3d at 101. Although the public’s confidence in 
private arbitration is worth protecting, it is comparatively 
less important than confidence in the judiciary. See 
Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83–84 (noting that while the 
judiciary’s appearance standard is too restrictive in 
arbitration cases, “we must not abjure our responsibility 
to maintain the integrity of the federal courts’ role in 
affirming or vacating awards”). All of this counsels in 
favor of the relaxed standard that we announced in 
Kaplan.  
Freeman nevertheless argues that Kaplan applies 
only to so-called actual-bias cases (where the relevant 
facts were known and objected to beforehand), not to 
nondisclosure cases (where the relevant facts were not 
disclosed). We see no reason to adopt a different standard 
for each type of case. The Federal Arbitration Act does 
not distinguish between actual-bias and nondisclosure 
cases—instead, it condemns “evident partiality” in all 
cases. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). And Kaplan is sufficiently 
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flexible to accommodate the vagaries of each case. 
Accordingly, we join the Sixth Circuit in applying this 
standard in nondisclosure cases. See Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. v. Home Ins., 429 F.3d 640, 644–45 (6th Cir. 2005). 
In a last-ditch effort to avoid our standard, 
Freeman invokes the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. Specifically, he cites Employment 
Arbitration Rule 12b(ii), which states that “[n]eutral 
arbitrators serving under these rules . . . shall have no 
relation . . . to the parties or their counsel that may create 
an appearance of bias” (emphasis added). That rule, 
however, does not govern our review. We are not at 
liberty to jettison the words of Congress in favor of a 
third-party standard. See Merit Ins. v. Leatherby Ins., 714 
F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Although we have great 
respect for the Commercial Arbitration Rules and the 
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, they are not the proper 
starting point for an inquiry into an award’s validity . . . . 
The arbitration rules and code do not have the force of 
law.”). We therefore reject the appearance standard. 
B 
The previous section defined the relevant standard: 
an arbitrator is evidently partial only if a reasonable 
person would necessarily conclude that the arbitrator was 
partial to one side. See Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1523 n.30. 
Now we must apply that standard to the case before us. 
Freeman’s claim ultimately fails because no reasonable 
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person would conclude that Lally-Green was partial to 
PGW. 
Freeman cites two supposed nondisclosures as 
evidence of Lally-Green’s partiality. First, she received 
$4,500 in campaign funds from PPG Industries—the 
minority owner of PGW—and its top-level employees. 
Second, she taught a seminar on labor law with Mack, 
PPG Industries’ senior employment attorney. The parties 
disagree whether she mentioned her relationship with 
Mack. In any event, they agree that she said nothing 
about the campaign contributions beyond her 
acknowledgment that she “knew some people at PPG 
[Industries].” App. 5f.  
We know of no other federal court that has 
considered whether undisclosed election funds are proof 
of “evident partiality.” For that matter, no federal court 
has considered whether they create an appearance of bias 
under the heightened judicial standard—perhaps because 
federal judges do not run for office. Cf. Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) (noting that 
under the Due Process Clause, “[n]ot every campaign 
contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability 
of bias that requires a judge’s recusal”). Even so, a 
variety of state courts have addressed these issues. With 
few exceptions, they have concluded that undisclosed 
election support does not establish “evident partiality,” 
see DeBaker v. Shah, 533 N.W.2d 464, 468–70 (Wis. 
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1995), nor does it create an appearance of bias, see, e.g., 
Adair v. State, Dep’t. of Educ., 709 N.W.2d 567, 579 
(Mich. 2006). 
We reach the same conclusion. The contributions 
from PPG Industries do not establish “evident partiality,” 
and the reasons are many. First of all, Lally-Green’s 
campaign funds are a matter of public record. In fact, 
PGW was able to view all contributions to her campaign 
after a five-minute internet search. We are unable to fault 
Lally-Green for not disclosing information that was 
readily available to the public. She may have assumed 
that the parties already knew about the funds. See 
DeBaker, 533 N.W.2d at 469 (“Because the information 
is public, there can be no allegation that [the arbitrator] 
intended to somehow hide the fact that he had received 
contributions from attorneys associated with the [party’s] 
law firm.”).  
Moreover, the contributions from PPG Industries 
are relatively small—far less than 1 percent of the $1.7 
million that she raised during her campaign. Compare id. 
(concluding that the arbitrator was not evidently partial 
when the contributions he received from the party’s 
attorney “were relatively small”), with Caperton, 556 
U.S. at 884–85 (concluding that the Due Process Clause 
required a judge’s recusal when the defendant’s chairman 
had provided the judge with more than half of his 
campaign funds at a time when the defendant’s case was 
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imminent). And under Pennsylvania law, Lally-Green 
could not directly solicit funds during her bid. Instead, 
she had to “establish [a] committee[] of responsible 
persons to secure . . . funds for [her] campaign.” Pa. 
Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 7(B)(2). As a result, the 
money does not at all suggest that Lally-Green had a 
close relationship with PPG Industries. Add to that PPG 
Industries’ status as a minority owner of PGW, and we 
fail to see any hint of bias that is “direct, definite, and 
capable of demonstration.” Andersons, 166 F.3d at 329. 
It also bears repeating that Lally-Green received a 
fivefold contribution from the law firm representing 
Freeman. This undercuts Freeman’s “evident partiality” 
claim because our standard requires evidence that Lally-
Green was partial to PGW in particular. See Kaplan, 19 
F.3d at 1523 n.30 (“[T]he challenging party must show a 
reasonable person would have to conclude that the 
arbitrator was partial to the other party.” (emphasis 
added) (citation and quotation marks omitted)). A 
reasonable person would not know which side Lally-
Green might be likely to favor. Freeman tries to 
downplay his firm’s contribution by drawing a distinction 
between parties and attorneys. We find the distinction 
unconvincing. Whether an arbitrator favors a party or its 
attorneys, the harm to the other party is no less real. 
Finally, we note that campaign contributions are a 
way of life in many state judicial systems. Putting aside 
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the wisdom of popular elections for judicial office, “to 
conclude that an arbitrator demonstrates evident partiality 
simply based on non-disclosure of [ ] publicly recorded 
and relatively small political campaign contributions 
would impose too great a burden on the system.” 
DeBaker, 533 N.W.2d at 469; see also Adair, 709 
N.W.2d at 579 (“[T]here is no justice in Michigan in 
modern times who has not received campaign 
contributions from such persons.”); Dean v. Bondurant, 
193 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Ky. 2006) (Roach, J., sitting 
alone) (“[U]nder Kentucky’s campaign election finance 
system, it is obvious, even expected, that lawyers will 
make most of the contributions to judicial candidates.”). 
As for Lally-Green’s teaching relationship, we 
conclude that it too fails to show “evident partiality”—
even if we accept Freeman’s claim that she did not 
disclose the relationship beforehand. By itself, a 
professional relationship with a party’s minority owner is 
not “powerfully suggestive of bias.” Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 
1523 n.30 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Nor is 
it a specific fact “that indicate[s] improper motives on the 
part of an arbitrator.” Peoples Sec., 991 F.2d at 146; see 
also Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 899, 
907–08 (E.D. Mich. 2006). The Federal Arbitration Act 
requires more than suppositions based on mutual 
familiarity. In fact, Justice White’s concurrence in 
Commonwealth Coatings “fully envisions upholding 
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awards when arbitrators fail to disclose insubstantial 
relationships.” Positive Software, 476 F.3d at 281–82 
(citing Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 152 (White, 
J., concurring)); Montez v. Prudential Sec., 260 F.3d 980, 
984 (8th Cir. 2001); cf. Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for 
Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“[M]andatory disqualification of a single judge [under 
§ 455(a)] is not warranted simply because of a 
professional relationship with a victim.”).  
We see no reason to vacate the arbitration. In 
hindsight, it might have been preferable for Lally-Green 
to disclose more about her relationship with PPG 
Industries. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 151 
(White, J., concurring) (“[I]t is far better that the 
relationship be disclosed at the outset, when the parties 
are free to reject the arbitrator . . . than to have the 
relationship come to light after the arbitration, when a 
suspicious or disgruntled party can seize on it as a pretext 
for invalidating the award.”). Even so, Lally-Green’s 
failure to say more does not establish “evident partiality” 
under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). 
VI 
Freeman also claims that Lally-Green fraudulently 
induced the arbitration agreement. Lally-Green told the 
parties that she “knew some people at PPG [Industries].” 
App. 5f. According to Freeman, this partial disclosure 
concealed the true nature of her relationship with PPG 
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Industries. He thus asserts that the arbitration agreement 
is voidable and that the arbitration is invalid. This claim 
is more than a stretch. 
In general, an innocent party can void a contract 
induced by fraud. See In Re Allegheny Int’l, 954 F.2d 
167, 178 (3d Cir. 1992). This doctrine applies with equal 
force to arbitration agreements—the defrauded party can 
void the agreement and pursue its claims in court. See 
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776, 2778 
(2010) (“Like other contracts, [arbitration agreements] 
may be invalidated by generally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” 
(citation and question marks omitted)).  
Freeman’s claim differs from the run-of-the-mill 
fraudulent-inducement claim. In most cases, a party to 
the agreement alleges that the other party fraudulently 
induced the agreement. See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Fin. Group, 
LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 265 (5th Cir. 2004). In this 
case, however, Freeman alleges that the arbitrator 
induced her selection through deceit. The Federal 
Arbitration Act certainly allows courts to vacate an 
arbitration if “the award was procured by corruption, 
fraud, or undue means.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1). And it 
allows courts to do the same if “there was . . . corruption 
in the arbitrators.” Id. § 10(a)(2). So Freeman is correct 
that we can vacate an arbitration if the arbitrator’s fraud 
led to her selection. 
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Freeman’s problem is that he must prove fraud in 
the inducement. Under Pennsylvania law, such claims 
have six elements: 
(1) a representation; (2) which is material to 
the transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, 
with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness 
as to whether it is true or false; (4) with the 
intent of misleading another into relying on 
it; (5) justifiable reliance on the 
misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting 
injury was proximately caused by the 
reliance. 
EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., 618 F.3d 253, 275 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Skurnowicz v. Lucci, 798 A.2d 788, 793 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)). Pennsylvania law also requires 
proof of each element by “clear and convincing 
evidence.” Id. 
Freeman fails miserably in his effort to satisfy 
these elements. We begin with the fourth: “intent [to] 
mislead[] another.” Id. As noted above, Lally-Green was 
unable to solicit funds directly. See Pa. Code of Jud. 
Conduct, Canon 7(B)(2). She might have been unaware 
that PPG Industries contributed to her campaign. And 
even if she knew of the contributions, she might have 
assumed that the parties were similarly aware. That is 
enough to defeat the element of intent. 
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Most grievously, Freeman does not even try to 
show that his “injury was proximately caused by [his] 
reliance.” EBC, 618 F.3d at 275. The only injury that 
Freeman alleges is that he lost at arbitration. This makes 
causation difficult to prove. Freeman must show that his 
discrimination claim would have succeeded in front of a 
different arbitrator. In effect, he has the “turducken task” 
of proving his discrimination claim within his fraud 
claim, F.T.C. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F.3d 1298, 
1315 (11th Cir. 2012), much like plaintiffs must do in 
legal malpractice suits, Dixon Ticonderoga Co. v. Estate 
of O’Connor, 248 F.3d 151, 175 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting 
“the case-within-a-case phenomenon that often arises in 
professional malpractice litigation”). Because Freeman 
makes no attempt to establish the elements of his 
discrimination claim, his fraud claim must fail. 
* * * 
For these reasons we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying Freeman’s motion to vacate. 
 
